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ARTICLE
THE "PROGRAM OR ACTIVITY" RULE IN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW: A COMMENT
ON S. 272, H.R. 700, AND S. 431
JOHN H. GARVEY*
In 1984 the Supreme Court determined in Grove City College v. Bell
that the antidiscrimination provisions of Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 were program-specific rather than institution-wide in appli-
cation. In response, several legislative proposals designed to mitigate or
reverse the Grove City decision have been introduced in Congress. These
proposals include the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985 (H.R. 700 and
S. 431) and the Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1985 (S. 272).
In this Article, Professor Garvey argues that institution-wide application
of Title IX and similar antidiscrimination statutes would in many instances
lead to results inconsistent with statutory language and the public interest.
By examining and analyzing the current statutes' language and by review-
ing and applying various theories of nondiscrimination law, Professor
Garvey concludes that most of the current proposals addressing Grove
City involve misconceptions of the statutes they would amend and fail to
conform to any of the numerous underlying theories of antidiscrimination
law.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v.
Bell' a number of bills have been introduced in Congress 2 to
amend the "program or activity" requirement currently found
in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), 3 Title IX
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; A.B., University
of Notre Dame, 1970; J.D., Harvard University, 1974. Prof. Garvey wishes to thank
Alex Aleinikoff for reading an earlier version of this paper. While serving in the Office
of the Solicitor General, Prof. Garvey participated in the preparation of the government's
briefs in Grove City and several other cases discussed herein; the views he expresses
are his own.
1 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
2 The principal proposals have been the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985,
H.R. 700, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985), and S. 431, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG.
REC. S1303 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985); the Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1985, S. 272,
99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S637 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985); and the Civil
Rights Act of 1984, H.R. 5490, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 2568, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S4588 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984). For a general discussion of these
proposals by one of the participants in the debate see Hatch, The Myths and Realities
of the Proposed Civil Rights Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LAW & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1986).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1982). Section 601 of Title VI provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1982) (emphasis added).
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of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX),4 Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504),1 and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 (ADA).6 Grove City held that the
words "program or activity" limited, to some degree, the federal
government's ability to control discriminatory behavior occur-
ring within institutions that receive federal financial assistance.
For example, if the government provides student financial aid
(Pell grants), 7 as it did at Grove City College,8 Title IX's pro-
hibition against sex discrimination can be enforced against the
college's financial aid program, but not elsewhere in the insti-
tution. A similar conclusion would follow for Title VI, Section
504, and the ADA, whose language is virtually identical to that
of Title IX. 9
The bills before the 99th Congress would amend the "program
or activity" restriction in different ways. To put the matter
briefly, S. 272 would require that in the case of educational
institutions (but not in other cases), the phrase "program or
activity" shall mean the entire "institution.' 0 H.R. 700" (S. 431
is its companion bill) proposes more substantial changes.
Though described as a bill "[tio restore the broad scope of
4 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982). Section 901 of Title IX provides that "[n]o person
in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982)
(emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States. . . shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. (emphasis added).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ADA]. 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1982)
provides that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under,
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" (emphasis added).
7 Pell grants (Basic Educational Opportunity Grants) provide eligible undergraduate
students with up to 70% of the cost of attendance at an institution of higher education.
The grants are designed to supplement family and student contributions to educational
expenses. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (1982).
8 See id. The Court found that Pell grants count not just as aid to students, but also
as assistance to the college they attend. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 563-70. This is obvious
from the legislative history of Title IX. See 117 CONG. REc. 30,408 (1971) (statement of
Sen. Bayh (D-Ind.)).
9 See supra notes 3, 5, and 6.
10 Hereinafter references to S. 272 will be by section number, without supporting
citations.
11 Hereinafter references to H.R. 700 will be by section number, without supporting
citations.
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coverage" to the antidiscrimination laws, 12 it actually envisions
radical reform rather than restoration. H.R. 700 would require
institution-wide coverage not just for schools, but for all recip-
ients of federal aid: state and local government agencies, cor-
porations and other private organizations, and so on.
This Article will discuss three points relevant to these bills.
Part I concludes that the present language of the antidiscrimi-
nation laws-despite what the proponents of H.R. 700 have
said-plainly requires program-specific rather than institution-
wide coverage. Part II reviews the reasons underlying the "pro-
gram or activity" rule. Part III evaluates the proposed legisla-
tion. I hope to show that the current limited degree of coverage
decreed by Grove City sufficiently advances Congress's concern
to keep federal dollars separated from discrimination, and that
abolition of the "program or activity" rule would entail costs
that have not been sufficiently appreciated by the bills'
supporters.
I. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
In large part the impetus behind the various bills designed to
overturn the Grove City decision stems from the idea that the
Supreme Court "unduly narrowed," 13 cut back, restricted, or
limited the well understood meaning of Title IX, and paid in-
sufficient heed to the intent of Congress in enacting that law
and its cognate statutes. If one subscribes to this notion it
becomes easy to represent amending legislation as nothing more
than a return to the status quo ante-a state of affairs with
which recipients were already accustomed to living, and to
which they could readjust with a minimum of bother. This is a
myth, composed in equal parts of wishful thinking and tactical
exaggeration. If amendment is desirable, it would be wise for
reformers to acknowledge that Congress has refused to impose
institution-wide coverage in the past, and that requiring such
coverage now would substantially change the law even as it
stood before Grove City.
2 H.R. 700, enacting clause (emphasis added).
,3 H.R. 700, sec. 2(1); S. 431, sec. 2(1).
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A. "Program or Activity," "Recipient," "Institution," and
"Political Entity"
There is a kind of doublethink involved in H.R. 700 and its
predecessor in the last Congress, H.R. 5490.14 After proclaiming
that the Supreme Court has "unduly narrowed ... the broad
application" of the antidiscrimination laws (section 2(1)) and that
"legislative action is necessary to restore the prior consistent
and long-standing" interpretation (section 2(2)), H.R. 700 goes
on to state that "the term 'program or activity"' does not mean
''program or activity," but instead means "all of the operations
of" a recipient institution.1 5 H.R. 5490 would have gone one
better, wiping out all references to "program or activity" and
replacing the phrase (as though it never existed) with
"recipient."16
It is clear from the current language of Title VI, Title IX,
Section 504, and the ADA that the obligations they now impose
are not institution-wide. Each begins with a prohibition against
discrimination in any "program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."'1 7 The statutes go on to make clear that the
phrase "program or activity" means something less than "recip-
ient," "educational institution," or "political entity."
As to the term "recipient," Title IX says: "No person ...
shall, on the ground of blindness . .. , be denied admission in
any course of study by a recipient ... for any education pro-
gram or activity . . . . -18 It also says that compliance may be
effected "by the termination of ... assistance under such pro-
gram or activity to any recipient. . ., but such termination...
shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part
thereof, in which ... noncompliance has been.., found."'19 So
Title IX presumes that a "recipient" (a university, for example)
may conduct any number of "programs or activities" (a financial
aid program, a physics program, an athletics program, and so
on). And it generally forbids discrimination within any program
14 H.R. 5490, supra note 2.
15 See H.R. 700, secs. 3(a), 4(2)(b), 5(a)(3), 6(a).
16 See H.R. 5490, secs. 2(a)(3), 2(a)(3)(B), 3(a)(4), 4(a)(1)-(2), 5(a)(3).
17 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982); 42
U.S.C. § 6102 (1982) (emphasis added).
18 20 U.S.C. § 1684 (1982).
9 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
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only if that program receives federal money.20 Blindness is an
exception: there "any" of a recipient's programs are covered.
Title VI speaks of effecting compliance in terms identical to
those used by Title IX. 21 The ADA is even clearer. After stating
that "[a]ny termination ... shall be limited to the particular...
recipient,"2 2 it goes on to declare that "[n]o such termination
... shall be based ... on any finding with respect to any
program or activity which does not receive Federal financial
assistance."
2
The term "educational institution" is defined in Title IX to
mean
any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary
school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or
higher education, except that in the case of an educational
institution composed of more than one school, college, or
department which are administratively separate units, such
term means each such school, college, or department. 24
But Title IX elsewhere speaks of "any program or activity of
any secondary school or educational institution. '"25 Thus an "ed-
ucational institution" might be something narrower than a "re-
cipient," but still broader than a "program or activity." If Uni-
versity X is a "recipient," it may comprise several "educational
institutions" if it has separate admissions requirements for its
law school, business school, and college of arts and sciences;
but within the college of arts and sciences there may also be a
number of "programs or activities."
The term "political entity" is used in the enforcement sections
of Title VI, Title IX, and the ADA, and is intended to refer to
something that conducts various programs and activities, not as
something that is itself a program or activity. Thus Title VI,
using language common to all the statutes, speaks of "termina-
tion ... limited to the particular political entity ... and ...
limited in its effect to the particular program ... in which ...
noncompliance has been ... found. '26 Section 504, speaking
20 20 U.S.C. § 1684 (1982). See supra text accompanying note 18.
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
- 42 U.S.C. § 6104(b) (1982).23 Id.
24 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1982).
25Id. at § 1681(a)(7)(B).
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
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not of state but of federal political entities, addresses its prohib-
ition of discrimination to "any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service."27
Debate on this matter has tended to obscure rather than clarify
this obvious point. There is a difference between "program"-
specific coverage and "institution"-wide (or "recipient"-wide)
coverage. It is impossible to read these statutes as they are
currently written and conclude that they intend the latter type
of coverage.
B. Coverage and Enforcement Are Coextensive
A number of witnesses have suggested a different way of
parsing the current language. What the laws do now, they have
argued, is to distinguish between coverage (which is institution-
wide) and fund termination as a means of enforcement (which
is program-specific).2 8 This interpretation is plainly wrong. To
begin with the most obvious point, both the prohibitions against
discrimination 29 and the authorizations for funds termination 30
speak of "programs," not of "recipients."
Moreover, the fund termination provisions follow right after
the directions to federal agencies to issue regulations. Title IX's
section 902, for example, says that each agency granting assis-
tance must carry out the provisions of section 901 by issuing
27 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
28 See Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 2568 before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as S. 2568 Hearings] (statement of Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., Chair-
man, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights); id. at 170 (statement of David S. Tatel, former
Director of the Office for Civil Rights in the U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare);
id. at 292-93 (statement of Judith Lichtman, executive director of the Women's Legal
Defense Fund); Civil Rights Act of 1984: Joint Hearings on H.R. 5490 before the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the Subcomm on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1984) (statement of John
B. Rhinelander, former General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare);
id. at 257 (statement of J. Stanley Pottinger, former Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights); H.R. REP. No. 829, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) ("[bly enacting
H.R. 5480, Congress will reaffirm its intent with respect to these provisions that they
be applied broadly and that fund termination continue to be more tailored in scope");
id. at 11-12, 14-16.
2 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
" See § 602 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982); § 902 of Title IX, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1682 (1982).
1986] Program or Activity Rule
regulations. 31 It then says that "[clompliance with any [regula-
tion] may be effected" by cutting off funds "to the particular
program, or part thereof"'32 in which noncompliance is found.
But if coverage (section 901) is really broader than the funds
termination provision (section 902), agencies would be required
to issue regulations that they could not enforce. As the Supreme
Court said in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,33 it would
be bizarre to suppose that Congress had ordered them to do
that.
One cannot avoid this problem by saying that broader statu-
tory coverage and broader regulations could be enforced, not
by funds termination, but by the "other means authorized by
law" mentioned in section 602 of Title VI,34 section 902 of Title
IX,35 and section 305(a) of the ADA.3 6 If the "other means" are
supposed to include private actions, we would have a situation-
unique in administrative law-where private individuals could
enforce an agency's regulations but the agency itself could not.37
3, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982). Section 902 states in part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant,
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized
and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect
to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of
the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the
action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless
and until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted
pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient
as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity
for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination
or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or
other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited
in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncom-
pliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law.....
32 Id.
3 456 U.S. 512, 537 (1982) ("it makes little sense to interpret the statute ... to
authorize an agency to promulgate rules that it cannot enforce").
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
33 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
36 42 U.S.C. § 6104(a) (1982).
17 1might add that there is an anachronism involved in relying on the possibility of
private actions to read the statutory coverage provisions more broadly than the enforce-
ment provisions. After all, it was not until 1979 that the Supreme Court found private
actions to be a permissible means of enforcing Title IX. Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Not until 1983 did a majority of the Court explicitly
acknowledge the possibility of private actions under Title VI-and even then only
against "a state or local agency." Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S.
582, 595 (1983) (opinion of White, J.); id. at 625 (opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting);
id. at 635-36 (opinion of Stevens, J., dissenting). And as late as 1984, the Court suggested
that it was still an open question whether there was a private right of action under
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The more obvious "other means" are injunctive actions to
enforce contractual conditions (assurances of compliance)
signed by recipients at the time of the grant,38 and actions to
enforce legal obligations imposed by the Constitution or other
statutes. 39 But an agency cannot make institution-wide coverage
a contractual condition that recipients must agree to before
getting assistance, since not only termination but also "refusal
to grant or to continue assistance" must be "limited in its effect
to the particular program, or part thereof, in which ... non-
compliance has been ... found .... ",40 And even if recipients
do have legal obligations under other laws, those laws do not in
any way enlarge the coverage of Title VI, Title IX, Section 504,
and the ADA.
C. Conclusion
The point made thus far has been a limited one: that these
statutes as currently written cover a narrower range of behavior
than many of those who favor amendment have asserted. This
is not an argument against amendment, for I have said nothing
about the reasons for covering a narrow (program-specific)
rather than a broad (institution-wide) range of behavior. It is a
reason, however, for exercising more caution than H.R. 700
Section 504. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 n.7 (1984). I think
that private suits are an appropriate means of enforcing each of these laws. Given the
uncertainty that may still exist about whether such actions are even permitted, however,
it is fanciful to point to them as evidence of what Congress was thinking 20 years ago,
's See United States v. Marion County School Dist., 625 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1980); 110
CONG. REC. 7066 (1964)(statement of Sen. Ribicoff (D-Conn.)); 28 C.F.R. § 50.3 (1984)
(federal agencies may sue for specific enforcement of assurances of compliance).
39 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1982) (civil action by Attorney General to challenge
school segregation); 45 C.F.R § 80.8(a)(1) (1984) ("a reference to the Department of
Justice with a recommendation that appropriate proceedings be brought to enforce any
rights of the United States under any law of the United States (including other titles of
the Act)").
Senator Pastore (D-R.I.) explained the purpose of the "other means" alternative thus:
This alternative is designed to permit the agency to avoid a fund cutoff if
some other means of ending discrimination is available. This will enable the
agency to achieve compliance without jeopardizing, even in limited fashion,
its basic program objective by terminating or refusing aid. Perhaps the best
example of this relates to school lunches or other assistance to segregated
schools. Cutoff of the lunches or other assistance will obviously impose a
severe hardship upon students who are intended to be benefited. The way to
avoid such a hardship will be for the Attorney General to institute a desegre-
gation suit under title IV [42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6], rather than to terminate the
assistance.
110 CONG. REc. 7060 (1964).
4 20 U.S.C. § 1682(1) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 6104(b) (1982).
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shows. That bill does not just "restore" or "clarify" statutory
meaning that the Supreme Court somehow missed. It changes
the theory underlying the obligations these laws impose.
The next Part turns to the reasons why the federal government
forbids people who get federal money to discriminate on the
basis of race, sex, handicap, and age. That discussion has two
objectives. The first is to show that the purposes Congress, the
courts, and federal agencies have historically given for these
rules are best accomplished by coverage of "programs and ac-
tivities," not "institutions." The second is to demonstrate that
to justify extending coverage as H.R. 700 would, one must re-
sort to a new theory, and be willing to accept costs to which
little attention has been devoted.
II. THE THEORIES SUPPORTING NONDISCRIMINATION
CONDITIONS ON FEDERAL SPENDING
One can find in congressional deliberations, judicial decisions,
and executive action seven different kinds of explanations for
why Congress must, or should, or may attach nondiscrimination
conditions to grants of federal money.4' I shall discuss these
various explanations by beginning with the most compelling
(those that are obligatory under the Constitution) and proceed-
ing more or less in sequence to the least compelling (those that
are sensible, desirable, or if nothing else, permissible). The
scope of coverage increases along this ranking: obligatory con-
ditions entail the narrowest coverage, merely permissible ones
the broadest.
A. The Intent Theory
The most obvious reason why Congress should insist on non-
discrimination by recipients of federal funds, at least on the
basis of race or sex, is that the Fifth Amendment forbids the
federal government to advance discriminatory ends in an inten-
tional fashion.4 2 The prohibition against intentional discrimina-
4, For an earlier and briefer statement of this thesis, see Garvey, Another Way of
Looking At School Aid, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 61. I argue there that the same kinds of
explanations underlie the Establishment Clause rules the Supreme Court has designed
to limit aid to parochial schools.
41 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1953) (racial segregation in District of Columbia
public schools denied black children Fifth Amendment due process rights).
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tion of course forbids laws that expressly discriminate. It also
forbids Congress to give money in an apparently neutral fashion
to recipients who will spend it all on white males, for example,
if that result is one that Congress anticipates and desires.
This theory played an important role in the enactment of Title
VI. Representative Celler (D-N.Y.), Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee and sponsor of the bill passed by the
House, 43 introduced at the outset of debate a statement indicat-
ing that "as to many of the Federal assistance programs to which
title VI would apply, the Constitution may impose on the United
States an affirmative duty to preclude racial segregation or dis-
crimination by the recipient of Federal aid."' 4 To the same
effect, Senator Pastore (D-R.I.), who was responsible for man-
aging Title VI in the Senate, opened the debate by declaring
that "so long as we spend that money to support a 'separate but
equal' system which has been denounced by the Supreme Court
of the United States, we are committing an unconstitutional act
.... "45 As both Celler and Pastore were aware, there were at
the time several federal aid programs-among them the Hill-
Burton Act,46 the Second Morrill Act,47 and impact aid for
school construction4 8 -that expressly or implicitly authorized
recipients to spend assistance under a "separate but equal"
formula. 49 And frequent mention was made of the Fourth Circuit
decision in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,50
which held the "separate but equal" provision governing Hill-
Burton grants unconstitutional.51
43 H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 1511 (1964).
44 110 CONG. REC. 1528 (1964).
45 110 CONG. REc. 7057 (1964).
46 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f) (1958) (repealed 1964) said that state plans should provide for
hospital facilities without discrimination, "but an exception shall be made in cases where
separate hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups, if the plan makes
equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities and services of like quality for
each such group ...."
47 7 U.S.C. § 323 (1958) provided that "the establishment and maintenance of [land
grant] colleges separately for [w]hite and colored students shall be held to be a compli-
ance with the provisions of said sections if the funds received in such State or Territory
be equitably divided as hereinafter set forth .... "
20 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(F) (1958) provided that each application for a grant should
include
assurance that the school facilities of such agency will be available to the
children for whose education contributions are provided in this chapter on the
same terms, in accordance with the laws of the State in which the school
district of such agency is situated, as they are available to other children in
such school district.
11 See 110 CONG. REc. 7062 (1964) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
50 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
5' Id. at 969. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1527 (statement of Rep. Celler); id. at 6544
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The intent theory is a limited one, however. It requires that
Congress not only must foresee that its money will be spent in
a discriminatory fashion, but also must want that to happen.
There must be a showing that it "selected ... a particular course
of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 52
That limitation on the theory entails several restrictions on
the scope of a recipient's activities controlled by the constitu-
tional principle. The first is that, at least as a practical matter,
the recipient as well as Congress must be engaged in intentional
discrimination, not merely discrimination in effect. Second, it
may not be enough that Congress provides substantial funding
to the recipient, or even to the particular project in which the
recipient has acted improperly. There might also have to be a
showing that Congress "is responsible for the specific conduct
of which the plaintiff complains. '53 Finally, it must be remem-
bered that while the Constitution quite strictly enjoins govern-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, and to a less exacting
degree gender, it does not afford very impressive protection
against discrimination on the basis of age54 or handicap. 55
B. The Opportunity Theory
Quite apart from what the Constitution requires, it is objec-
tionable to have recipients spending federal money in a discrim-
inatory fashion even without Congress's approval or awareness.
This is not a matter of moral responsibility on the part of the
federal government, since we are accustomed to think that peo-
ple are blameworthy only for what they purposefully do. But
(statement of Sen. Humphrey (D-Minn.)); id. at 7054, 7062 (statement of Sen. Pastore)
(1964).
32 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
51 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (emphasis added and original emphasis
omitted) (the fact that the state regulates and funds private nursing homes does not
render it responsible for decisions of homes to discharge patients); see also Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (a private school's receipt of public funds does not
make its decision to discharge teachers state action). Though state action law is unclear
on the subject, I have some reservations about whether this requirement would be
enforced in a case of intentional discrimination-a problem not presented in Blum and
Rendell-Baker. The Court might be more willing to hold the government responsible in
a case of wrongful intent, much as we do "in blaming a defendant for remote damages
caused by intentional torts, or in finding complicity in someone else's criminal conduct."
Garvey, supra note 41, at 73.
m See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
5 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3269 (1985).
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citizens and taxpayers are entitled to insist that their represen-
tatives exercise sufficient foresight to preclude even unwitting
discrimination from occurring (by providing opportunities for
recipients to misbehave).
This theory was the primary concern voiced during the de-
bates on Title VI, which are replete with references to the use
of federal dollars to "support" 56 or "subsidize"5 7 discrimination.
As Senator Pastore put it, "Title VI is necessary, first of all,
because the Federal Government simply cannot be expected to
continue to pay out tax dollars contributed by all the people to
just some of them and to exclude others because of the color of
their skin.
'58
A similar concern prompted Congress to attach Title IX re-
strictions to Pell grants. As Representative May (R-Wash.)
stated in the first hearings to be held on the subject:
Here we have this scholarship money-much of it ... fed-
eral-going to students. Which students receive this schol-
arship money is decided upon by the individual colleges and
universities-where there are often quota restrictions on
women recipients. Thus, we find ourselves faced with a
situation wherein federal funds are subsidizing discrimina-
tory opportunities-and there is no way to get it back!59
The principle supporting the Opportunity Theory is that the
government should not increase the resources recipients have
m See, e.g., 110 CoNG. REC. 6544 (statement of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 7057 (state-
ment of Sen. Pastore) (1964).
Id. at 7055 (statement of Sen. Pastore).
s' Id. at 7061-62. See also id. at 7058 (statement of Sen. Pastore); id. at 7061 (statement
of Sen. Pastore); id. at 7063 (statement of Sen. Pastore); id. at 7064 (statement of Sen.
Ribicoff) ("That principle is (that] taxpayers' money, which is collected without dis-
crimination, shall be spent without discrimination."); id. at 7065 (statement of Sen.
Keating (R-N.Y.)) ("the principle that Federal money should be fairly distributed when
the tax collector comes along and takes money from the pocket or the pay envelope of
everyone.").
See also H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 2, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (serial set 12544), reprinted
in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2512 (Additional views of Reps. Mc-
Culloch (R-Ohio), Lindsay (R-N.Y.), Cahill (R-N.J.), Shriver (R-Kan.), MacGregor (R-
Minn.), Mathias (R-Md.), and Bromwell (R-Iowa): "In every essential of life, American
citizens are affected by programs of Federal financial assistance .... For the Govern-
ment, then, to permit the extension of such assistance to be carried on in a racially
discriminatory manner is to violate the precepts of democracy and undermine the
foundations of Government.")
59 Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the
Special Subcomm. on Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 235 (1970). See also id. at 306 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler,
Chairman, Action Comm. for Fed. Contract Compliance in Educ., Women's Equity
Action League); id., pt. 2, at 739-40 (statement of Rep. Griffiths (D-Mich.)); id., pt. 2,
at 801-04 (Women in the Univ. of Chicago, Report of the Comm. on Univ. Women);
118 CONG. REc. 5656 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (1972) (indicating that women receive a
disproportionately small share of NDEA Title IV and Title VI awards).
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available to engage in discrimination. Whatever evil a recipient
could work within the limits of its pre-grant budget, Congress
should not enable it to do more evil with federal assistance. To
safeguard that principle, it suffices to trace the federal dollars
and insist that they be spent for proper purposes. To return to
Representative May's example, it would satisfy the Opportunity
principle if Congress insisted that federal scholarship money be
given evenhandedly to men and women alike, even if the school
continued to restrict its own scholarship money to men.
If one reads the "program or activity" language of the anti-
discrimination statutes with this theory in mind, it appears that
the most sensible construction would limit that phrase to the
federal grant program (Pell grants), rather than to the recipient's
program (a college financial aid program, including the school's
own scholarship funds) that receives federal aid. That is the
interpretation adopted by several early cases. In Board of Public
Instruction v. Finch,60 for example, the court-discussing the
legislative history of Title VI-noted:
In the Senate where the program limitation was initiated,
reference was frequently made to the school lunch program,
to the agricultural extension program for home economics
teachers, to the farm-to-market road program, to aid for
vocational agriculture teaching, and to aid to impacted
school districts. Senator Eastland went so far as to introduce
in the Congressional Record a long list of the federal pro-
grams to which the cutoff provision was applicable, as did
Congressmen Poff and Cramer in the House. HEW in issuing
regulations to implement the cutoff provision has followed a
similar procedure. All of these lists refer to particular grant
statutes such as those before us, not to a collective concept
known as a school program or a road program.
61
As I will indicate below,62 the Supreme Court adopted a more
expansive theory of coverage in Grove City.63 For the moment,
I wish only to observe that this fairly narrow Opportunity The-
ory has played a central role both in Congress's deliberations
and the courts' interpretations. 64
- 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
61 Id. at 1077 (citations omitted).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
61465 U.S. at 571 n.21.
64 Cases besides Finch that rely on the Opportunity Theory include Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) ("Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all
taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, en-
trenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination"); Gautreaux v. Romney, 457
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C. The Joint Venture Theory
Even if it can be shown that federal money has not been spent
in a discriminatory fashion, there often arises a legitimate con-
cern with the appearance of impropriety. In cases where the
federal government undertakes a joint project, and its partner
engages in discrimination in the very same project, one may
rightly feel that the government is condoning, if not supporting,
wrongful behavior. As Representative Mink (D-Hawaii) stated
in 1975:
For example, the slide projector in one classroom might be
purchased with title I ESEA money, while the slide projector
in the adjacent room was not. It surely is not the intent of
Congress to prohibit sex--or race or national origin-dis-
crimination in the room with the title I projector, while al-
lowing it in the adjacent room.65
This Joint Venture Theory is the most appropriate justification
for the "program or activity" rule in each of these statutes and
the regulations that carry them out.66 It is illustrated by the
Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Title VI
regulation defining "program": "The services ... provided un-
F.2d 124, 128 (7th Cir. 1972) ("schools and programs are not condemned en masse by
Section 602 ... where racial discrimination and segregation are found in isolated
activities, but only if such activities utilize federal money for unconstitutional ends");
and Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967) (school district
receiving impact aid to pay for the education of children at an air force base is obligated
to spend it in a nondiscriminatory fashion).
The Opportunity Theory, with its emphasis on the use of federal program monies,
provides the most natural interpretation for much of the statutory language in Title VI
and Title IX. For example, section 602 of Title VI speaks of termination of "assistance
under such program or activity to any recipient" (emphasis added), and says that
termination reports have to be filed "with the committees of the House and Senate
having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved ...." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-1 (1982). Section 605 also speaks of "any program or activity under which
Federal financial assistance is extended by way of a contract of insurance or guaranty"
(emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 (1982). See also 20 U.S.C. 55 1682, 1685 (1982).
This "federal program" interpretation of the "program or activity" language is urged in
3 R. CAPPALLI, FEDERAL GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS §§ 19.33, 19.52
(1982).
6 Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1975) (Title
IX) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
66 While there is language in each of the statutes that is best read as referring to
federal programs and adopting Theory B (Opportunity), see supra note 64, there is also
language suggesting an intent to control some things a recipient does with its own
money. The prohibition section of each act speaks of a "program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance" (emphasis added). 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) (Title IX); 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (§ 504); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) (Title VI); 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1982)
(ADA).
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der a program receiving Federal financial assistance shall be
deemed to include any services . . . provided ... with the aid
of any non-Federal funds ... required to be expended or made
available for the program to meet matching requirements
"167
This is also the theory relied on by the Supreme Court in
Grove City and North Haven. In Grove City the college argued
that, if Pell grants were financial assistance to the school, it
should be subject to Title IX only in its administration of the
Pell grant program.68 The government contended, on the con-
trary, that it would be just as incongruous to cover federal
scholarships and exempt the school's own as it would be to
cover one slide projector but not another. The Court upheld the
government's contention, saying:
Just as employees who "work in an education program that
receive[s] federal assistance," North Haven Board of Edu-
cation v. Bell, [456 U.S.] at 540, are protected under Title
IX even if their salaries are "not funded by federal money,"
ibid., so also are students who participate in the College's
federally assisted financial aid program but who do not them-
selves receive federal funds protected against discrimination
on the basis of sex.69
This Joint Venture Theory is not, however, equivalent to a
general principle of guilt by association. 70 It distinguishes-as
do Title VI, Title IX, Section 504, and the ADA-between a
"recipient" and the various "programs or activities" that a re-
cipient might conduct, and forbids government participation in
the latter if they involve discrimination. The Supreme Court
recognized this distinction in Grove City by declining to apply
Title IX to the entire college. Its holding only confirmed what
the lower courts had been saying for a long time.
71
45 C.F.R. § 80.13(g) (1984). Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (1984) (Department of Educa-
tion's Title IX regulation on student financial aid).
61465 U.S. at 571 n.21.
9 Id.
70 "Congress did not intend that such a program suffer for the sins of others. HEW
was denied the right to condemn programs by association." Finch, 414 F.2d at 1078.
71 For a sampling of the numerous cases applying the nondiscrimination statutes in a
program-specific fashion, see Hillsdale College v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ.
and Welfare, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982)(Title IX), vacated and remanded, 466 U.S.
901 (1984); Doyle v. University of Ala., 680 F.2d 1323, 1326-27 (1lth Cir. 1982) (§ 504);
Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338-39 (Ist Cir. 1981)
(Title IX), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris,
622 F.2d 735, 736-38 (5th Cir. 1980) (Title IX), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
456 U.S. 986 (1982); Romeo Community Schools v. United States Dep't of Health,
Educ. and Welfare, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir. 1979) (Title IX), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
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HHS's Title VI regulations respect the same distinction. They
give the following example to "illustrate the programs aided by
Federal financial assistance of the Department": "In a training
grant to a hospital or other nonacademic institution, discrimi-
nation is prohibited in the selection of individuals to be trained
and in their treatment by the grantee during their training. '72
The regulation does not say that the entire hospital-the
"recipient" 73 -is subject to Title VI by virtue of the training
grant.
74
The distinction between "recipients" and "programs" is in-
tended to protect the public interest in a government project
972 (1979); Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 126-28 (7th Cir. 1972) (Title VI); Finch,
414 F.2d at 1078 (Title VI); Bachman v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 577
F. Supp. 1257, 1262-63 (D.N.J. 1983) (§ 504); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F.
Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982) (Title IX); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp.
1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (Title IX), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983);
Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 394, 396 n.1 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (Title
IX); Simon v. St. Louis County Police Dep't, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1363,
1364 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (§ 504); Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1313-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Title VI); Hupart v. Board of Higher Educ., 420 F. Supp. 1087, 1104
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Title VI); Mandel v. United States Dep't. of Health, Educ. and
Welfare, 411 F. Supp. 542, 556-59 (D. Md. 1976)(Title VI), aff'd, 571 F.2d 1273 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978); McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp.
498, 502 (D.N.M. 1970) (Title VI); Cameron Parish Police Jury v. Hickel, 302 F. Supp.
689 (W.D. La. 1969) (Title VI).
7 45 C.F.R. § 80.5(d) (1984).
73 See 45 C.F.R. § 80.13(i) (1984).
74 This distinction between a narrower "program or activity" (covered by nondiscri-
mination rules) and a wider "recipient" institution (which may conduct a number of
programs or activities) permeates the Title VI, Title IX, Section 504, and ADA
regulations.
As to Title VI, see HHS's regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 80.2 ("Application of this
regulation"), 80.3 ("Discrimination prohibited"), 80.8(c) ("Procedure for effecting com-
pliance: termination of or refusal to grant or to continue Federal financial assistance"),
80.13(g),(i) (definitions of the terms "program" and "recipient") (1984).
As to Title IX, see the Department of Education's (ED) regulations at 34 C.F.R.
99 106.11 ("Application"), 106.31(a) ("Education programs and activities"), 106.51(a)
("Employment") (1984). These provisions, particularly the latter two, are slightly am-
biguous. The employment regulation, for example, prohibits gender discrimination "un-
der any education program or activity operated by a recipient which receives or benefits
from Federal financial assistance .... 34 C.F.R. § 106.51(a) (1984). The "which"
clause may modify either "recipient" or "program or activity." But since a "recipient"
by definition gets federal financial assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1984), while a
"program or activity" may not, the clause is redundant if it does not refer to the latter.
See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 539 n.30. The explanation given when the regulations
were promulgated makes clear that this reading is the correct one. See 40 Fed. Reg.
24,128 (1975).
As to Section 504, see the Department of Justice's (DOJ) regulations at 28 C.F.R.
§§ 41.5(8) ("Enforcement"), 41.51 ("General prohibitions against discrimination") (1984);
and HHS's regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 84.5 ("Assurances required") (1984); id., Pt. 84,
App. A, para. 7 ("Assurances of compliance")(1984).
As to the ADA, see HHS's regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 90.3(2) (1984) ("What programs
and activities does the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 cover?").
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(training nurses or promoting the study of chemistry, let us say),
which would be frustrated if an unrelated but discriminatory
program brought the federally funded project to a halt. As the
Fifth Circuit stated in Finch, the program-specific limitation is
"not for the protection of the political entity whose funds might
be cut off, but for the protection of the innocent beneficiaries
of programs not tainted by discriminatory practices."75
D. The Infection Theory
Infection is not an independent theory, but a means of ex-
panding the reach of Theories B (Opportunity) and C (Joint
Venture). The Infection Theory rests on the notion that a recip-
ient may, by discriminating in a project closely related to one
receiving federal funds, either cause the federal money to be
used in a discriminatory fashion (B), or at least cause discrimi-
nation to occur in the funded project (C). For example, if the
federal government gave financial aid to some students at Law
School X, Grove City holds that the Law School's financial aid
office would be covered by Title IX. But if the Law School
discriminated against women in its admission process, some
qualified women (denied admission) would never reach the fi-
nancial aid office. One could thus say that discrimination in the
admissions program "infected" the financial aid program, and
that both should therefore be covered by Title IX.
76
In fact it is fair to say that "[o]ne who is discriminated against
in seeking admission is denied access to all educational pro-
grams and activities within an institution, and the entire body
of programs within the school is tainted. '77 For this reason the
regulations under Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504 all forbid
7- 414 F.2d at 1075 (emphasis in original).
76 Title IX applies generally to the admissions policies of professional, vocational,
and graduate schools, and public undergraduate schools. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1982).
See also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2) (1982), 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.16, 106.17 (1984) (delayed
application of nondiscrimination requirements for "educational institutions commencing
planned change in admission [policy]"); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1982), 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.15(e) (1984) (nondiscrimination requirements are not applicable to public under-
graduate schools that "traditionally and continually from [their] establishment [have]
had a policy of admitting only students of one sex"). But see Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (admissions policy excluding males from nursing
school of traditionally all-female university violated Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding the Title IX exception in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
77 Rice, 663 F.2d at 339 n.2; Othen, 507 F. Supp. at 1387.
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recipients to discriminate in admissions, no matter what part of
their operations might receive federal aid.
7
In other contexts the infection could be harder to trace. If the
federal government funds a college physics lab, and women are
permitted to take physics but not math, it seems obvious that
the federal project (training physicists) is significantly under-
mined. Excluding women from math classes would effectively
preclude aspiring female physicists from taking full advantage
of the government's program. Hence the school's math depart-
ment should also be covered by nondiscrimination require-
ments. 79 More tenuous is the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that
discrimination in selection for a private honor society (assisted
in various ways by the University of Miami) necessarily infected
all federally funded programs at the school.8 0 If the question
were whether the Department of Education should cut off aid
to Miami's physics department, I think it should be resolved
under the Infection Theory by asking whether ineligibility for
election to the honor society would deprive women of the ben-
efits that Congress intended to confer, in the same way that
78 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.15(c) (1984) (ED Title IX regulations) (prohibition against
discrimination on basis of sex in admission and recruitment "applies to each recipient,"
except as provided in § 106.15(e) (see supra note 76)); 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(d)(1), (2) (1984)
(HHS Title VI regulations) (nondiscrimination requirements apply to "admission or
recruitment" practices of a recipient). Of course when an institution has separate ad-
missions policies for different programs, it may not make sense to presume that dis-
crimination in admissions to program A will infect program B. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R,
§ 80.5(c) (1984):
In a research, training, demonstration, or other grant to a university for activ-
ities to be conducted in a graduate school, discrimination in the admission and
treatment of students in the graduate school is prohibited, and the prohibition
extends to the entire university unless it satisfies the responsible Department
official that practices with respect to other parts or programs of the university
will not interfere, directly or indirectly, with fulfillment of the assurance re-
quired with respect to the graduate school. (Emphasis added).
79 Consider another problem that arises with some frequency. Title VI does not apply
to claims for employment discrimination, except where a primary objective of the federal
financial assistance is to provide employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1982); Valentine v.
Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 511-12 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981). But in some
circumstances discrimination in employment will infect the product the federal govern-
ment is paying to deliver to the program beneficiaries. For example, discrimination in
the selection of faculty to deliver Title I services (now chapter 1 of the Education
Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3808 (1982 & Supp. I
1983)) to disadvantaged children in grade schools and high schools would be forbidden
because of its effect on the children, even if individual teachers had no Title VI claim.
See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 882-86 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); United States v. El Camino Community
College Dist., 454 F. Supp. 825, 830-31 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
10 Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. Unit B), vacated as
moot, 464 U.S. 67 (1983).
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discriminating in admissions or closing the math department to
them would. I would be surprised it it did.
This is not to say that sex discrimination in selection for honor
societies is morally neutral conduct, or even that Congress
should not undertake to combat it. In fact S. 272 and H.R. 700
would do just that. The Infection Theory, however, properly
understood as a qualification of Theories B (Opportunity) and
C (Joint Venture), does not provide a reason for doing so.
Infection is not an independent justification for rooting out dis-
crimination wherever it occurs, but simply a way of protecting
federal programs from corruption-originating elsewhere-that
is certain to affect their intended beneficiaries in a discrimina-
tory fashion.
E. The Benefits Theory
The Infection Theory rests on the idea that discrimination
upstream from the federal program can sometimes flow into and
corrupt it. The Benefits Theory holds that federal aid to an
innocent program may provide a benefit to discrimination that
occurs downstream. The objections to this phenomenon are not
new: the federal government should not assist, even unwittingly,
in providing opportunities for discrimination to occur (Theory
B), or the federal government should not appear to condone
discrimination by participating in a project where it occurs (The-
ory C). The Benefits Theory augments these theories by follow-
ing the principles of opportunity and participation beyond the
boundaries of the federally assisted program or activity.
This theory is a relatively recent concoction. It has no current
statutory foundation, 81 and does not appear in the Title VI reg-
ulations. The Benefits Theory first arose in limited form in the
Title IX regulations promulgated in 1975. Those regulations ap-
ply the theory to different programs within the same recipient
institution: "[Tihis Part ... applies to every recipient and to
each education program or activity operated by such recipient
which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance.
' 82
81 The statutes speak of being "excluded from participation in,... denied the benefits
of, or... subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance" (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) (Title VI); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1982) (Title IX); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (§ 504); 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1982)
(ADA).
8 45 C.F.R. § 86.11 (1984); 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 (1984) (emphasis added).
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Pell grants, for example, which Grove City held are "received"
by a college's financial aid program, may "benefit" the physics
department if that is where the tuition money is ultimately ap-
plied. 83 Or suppose that a university receives a grant to buy land
for a law school, including space for a parking lot. To the extent
that the law school's lot relieves congestion around the physics
department and the business school, those programs may be
said to "benefit" from the federal assistance.
The Section 504 regulations promulgated in 1977 take the
theory one step further. They suggest that program x (and maybe
even institution X, which runs it) is subject to the regulations if
it benefits in some way from federal aid to program y (run by
institution Y): "Subpart F applies to health, welfare, and other
social service programs and activities that receive or benefit
from Federal financial assistance and to recipients that operate,
or that receive or benefit from Federal financial assistance for
the operation of, such programs or activities." 84 This version of
the theory could mean that a trucking company, which "bene-
fits" from highways built by the state with federal assistance,
would for that reason alone be subject to Section 504 in its
hiring of drivers.
As I said, both versions of the Benefits Theory stretch the
current statutory language; the response of the courts and com-
mentators has not been favorable to it.85 One difficulty, apart
from the statutory language problem, is that it
requires grant administrators to perform an analytical task
which has baffled philosophers for centuries. No human or
465 U.S. at 571, 573-74.
- 45 C.F.R. § 84.51 (1984); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31, 84.41 (1984) (similar provi-
sions for preschool, elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education programs).
8 The Supreme Court in Grove City rejected the Title IX version, holding that
"Congress [did not] intend[] that the Department's regulatory authority [should] follow
federally aided students from classroom to classroom, building to building, or activity
to activity." 465 U.S. at 573. The Section 504 theory was rejected in Disabled in Action
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881, 884 (4th Cir. 1982) (where city had received federal
funds for stadium improvements, baseball club using stadium was not a "recipient"
subject to the requirements of Section 504), and Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, 519
F. Supp. 1173, 1178 (D.D.C. 1981) (receipt of federal funds by airport does not thereby
subject commercial airline to the requirements of Section 504). See also Jacobson v.
Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1213-15 (9th Cir. 1984) (federal airport grants do not
subject air carriers to the proscriptions of Section 504), cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 2129
(1985). But see Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694,
713-16 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 244 (1985). The D.C. Circuit, overruling
Angel, held that Section 504 regulations apply to all commercial air carriers based on
federal funding of airports and "airways," their integration with all commercial air
carriers, and the clear intent of Congress. See also 3 R. CAPPALLI, supra note 64, at
§ 20.10 (1982).
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machine mind can trace all the cause-effect relationships
generated by a social program or activity. One will always
be able to construct, but never be able to verify, a logical
chain in which a federal dollar entering Point A in an orga-
nization is shown to have had beneficial effects at Point B
(the area of discrimination) .86
The Section 504 version of the theory is also inconsistent with
an enforcement scheme keyed to the federal spending power.
Where a recipient of federal funds is innocent, but its federal
funds are thought to aid discrimination occurring in another
institution downstream, it would be perverse to cut off funding
to the innocent party in order to reform someone else's
behavior.87
F. Accounting Problem #1: The Tracing Theory
The difficulties of accounting for federal money once it
reaches a recipient affect the question of coverage for nondis-
crimination conditions in several ways. First, it is often hard to
tell exactly where federal money is spent. Second, it may be
that aid to one of a recipient's programs could free up portions
of the pre-grant budget to be spent elsewhere. Both of those
possibilities are reasons for enlarging coverage to some degree.
This section will deal with the first problem (the Tracing The-
ory); the next section will deal with the second (the Freed-Up
Funds Theory).
The Tracing Theory is a method of rounding off the area in
which Theory B (Opportunity) applies. The theory's underlying
principle is a narrow one: federal dollars should not be put to
8 3 R. CAPPALLI, supra note 64, at § 20.10.
87 1 should clarify this point by making two qualifications. First, there is a difference
between institutions (or programs) that merely "benefit" from federal aid in the sense
used in the text, and those that might be called "subrecipients'"-i.e. those "to whom
Federal financial assistance is extended ... through another recipient." 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.2(h) (1984). For example, the federal government gives money for the school lunch
program to state educational agencies, which in turn give the money to schools. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1753, 1756, and 1757 (1982). Congress plainly intended that the schools
themselves should be covered by Title VI, see 110 CONG. REC. 8978-80 (1964) (state-
ment of Sen. Humphrey), because they do not merely "benefit" from, but actually
"receive" the federal money; they are the last stop before the program beneficiary. And
cutting off funds to a discriminating school applies pressure in the right place.
Second, colleges whose students receive Pell grants, though they are not "subreci-
pients" in the sense used above, should also be considered as "receiving" rather than
merely "benefiting" from federal aid because that is where Congress intended the money
to go. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 563-70.
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discriminatory use. To enforce that principle it is necessary to
find out precisely how a recipient spends its federal money.
However, as Representative Mink said about Title IX: "It is
difficult to trace the Federal dollars precisely. A narrow inter-
pretation of Title IX would render the law meaningless and
virtually impossible either to enforce or to administer.""8
One possible solution to the tracing problem is for Congress
to require physical segregation of federal funds, separate line-
item accounts, and federal audits so that each dollar can be
followed until it leaves the recipient's hands. That solution is
unpalatable for two reasons. First, it complicates potential en-
forcement actions by the granting agency and by private plain-
tiffs, since they must follow a tortuous paper trail to prove the
path of the federal dollar before even reaching the merits of any
discrimination question. Second, such accounting requirements
place a heavy burden on the recipient, which must keep its
books and funds in the prescribed fashion, and periodically
entertain squads of federal overseers.
A second solution to the tracing problem, easier to enforce
and on balance less burdensome for the recipient, is to extend
the nondiscrimination conditions to its smallest administrative
unit within which the money will be spent. Where a college and
the government share the cost of constructing a building, one
cannot assume that the school paid for one portion of the build-
ing and the government for another,89 or that the government
paid for the first half of its useful life and the school for the
second half.90 But if one can be sure that the government's
8 1975 Hearings, supra note 65, at 166.
89 See 45 C.F.R. § 80.5(3) (1984) (HHS's Title VI regulations for construction grants):
In case of hospital construction grants the assurance ... will apply to the
entire facility for which, or for a part of which, the grant is made, and to
facilities operated in connection therewith. In other construction grants the
assurances required will similarly be adapted to the nature of the activities to
be conducted in the facilities for construction of which the grants have been
authorized by Congress.
For an example of the application of this regulation, see Flanagan v. President &
Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377, 382-84 (D.D.C. 1976) (receipt of
federal funds for construction of law school subjected law school's scholarship and
financial aid programs to Title VI requirements). See also 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(d)(2) (1984).
90 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.5(b)(1) (1984) (HHS's Section 504 regulation):
In the case of Federal financial assistance extended in the form of real property
or to provide real property or structures on the property, the assurance will
obligate the recipient ... for the period during which the real property or
structures are used for the purpose for which Federal financial assistance is
extended or for another purpose involving the provision of similar services or
benefits.
See also 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(2)(1) (1984) (HHS Title VI regulations), and 34 C.FR,
§ 106.4(b)(1) (1984) (ED Title IX regulations).
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money was spent somewhere on the building, then Theories B
and F (Opportunity and Tracing) would be satisfied by imposing
nondiscrimination restrictions on the entire building, and it is
unnecessary to extend them to the entire college. 91
The Tracing Theory would, however, require institution-wide
coverage in the case of unrestricted grants. If a local educational
agency receives impact aid92 or a college gets aid for developing
institutions, 93 the money can be used for almost any programs
or activities the recipient conducts. Rather than require plaintiffs
to prove where the assistance actually was spent, the Tracing
Theory would permit the assumption that it flowed throughout
the institution.94
The results one reaches applying this theory are similar to
those dictated by Theory C (Joint Venture). The concern of this
theory is to follow federal dollars to ensure that they are not
misspent. Theory C is concerned with the federal government
appearing to condone discrimination by sharing in a project with
a partner that misuses its own money. But the difficulties of
fund accounting will often require the tracing of federal money
to stop at the project-a building, a college financial aid pro-
gram, a park, a sewer system-for which it was appropriated.
Like the Joint Venture Theory, then, the Tracing Theory pro-
91 Compare Flanagan, 417 F. Supp. at 382-84, with Stewart v. New York Univ., 430
F. Supp. 1305, 1313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (law school receiving HUD money to build a
private school dormitory was not therefore obligated to comply with Title VI in law
school admissions). In Stewart, admissions "activity" presumably was conducted on
premises other than those of the federally funded dormitory. 430 F. Supp. at 1314.
9 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-241-1 (1982 & Supp. 11983).
9 20 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1069c (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
- 45 C.F.R. § 80.5(b) (1984). This provides an alternative explanation for Bossier
Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967), in which the "school system
... [received] nearly two million dollars between 1951 and 1964 under the provisions
of 20 U.S.C. [1964 ed.] §§ 631-645 [impact aid]." 370 F.2d at 850.
The Revenue Sharing Act, 31 U.S.C. § 6716(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11983), has adopted
a variation on this approach. It relieves plaintiffs of the obligation of tracing funds by
adopting a presumption of institution-wide coverage, but permits the recipient state or
local government to prove, "by clear and convincing evidence, that a payment received
under this chapter is not used to pay for any part of the program or activity with respect
to which the allegation of discrimination is made." Id.
That variation can also be found in the HHS Title VI regulation discussing the
assurance of coijpliance form required of colleges and hospitals. The regulation states
that the assurance shall, in certain instances,
be applicable to the entire institution unless the applicant establishes, to the
satisfaction of the responsible Department official, that the institution's prac-
tices in designated parts or programs of the institution will in no way affect its
practices in the program of the institution for which Federal financial assistance
is sought ....
45 C.F.R. § 80.4(d)(2) (1984).
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vides a justification for forbidding discrimination in any "pro-
gram or activity" receiving federal financial assistance-the rule
adopted by Title VI, Title IX, Section 504, and the ADA as
currently written.
G. Accounting Problem #2: The Freed-Up Funds Theory
This theory underlay the Third Circuit's decisions in Grove
City95 and Haffer v. Temple University,96 and an earlier district
court decision in Bob Jones University v. Johnson.97 The idea
is that when the federal government gives a college $500,000 to
spend on teaching physics, the college can then take $500,000
of its own money out of the physics budget and spend it on
men's athletics. Furthermore, the theory continues, just as it is
wrong for a recipient to spend the government's money in a
discriminatory fashion, so it is also wrong to spend funds which
the government's money has "freed up" in such a fashion. This
approach makes tracing federal monies irrelevant, since the
precise source of the funds spent on discrimination is unimpor-
tant. What counts is the ripple effect caused by the federal
splash.
There are circumstances in which this makes practical as well
as economic sense. Suppose that my law school got a grant to
develop a clinical training program. 98 Some of the money would
go toward paying my salary, if I were the one chosen to run the
program. In actual practice the university central administration
would not reduce my dean's budget by that sum, since he would
need it to hire a visitor to teach my courses. If my dean then
95 687 F.2d 684 (1982).
688 F.2d 14 (1982).
9 396 F. Supp. 597, 602 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1974). See also
Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (to the extent that a
university receives federal funding, component entities benefit indirectly through real-
location of funds); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D.
N.J. 1980) (Section 504 applicable to all the activities engaged in by school system
receiving federal funds, even if no federal funds spent on a particular activity).
The decision in Bob Jones can be more easily explained, however, by Theory D
(Infection). Bob Jones University discriminated on the basis of race in admissions, and
the court upheld an administrative order terminating student financial aid in the form of
veterans' benefits. 396 F. Supp. at 589-600. Since under Grove City the University's
entire financial aid program was covered, and since the discrimination in admissions
prevented unmarried nonwhite applicants from getting financial aid (or anything else)
from the University, the same result would follow even if one rejected Theory G (Freed-
Up Funds).
920 U.S.C. § 1134n (1982) (authorizes federal grants to law schools for expansion of
clinical experience programs).
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discriminated on the basis of race or sex in hiring a visitor, there
would be a fairly direct connection between the federal aid and
his act: not only was the money freed up by a federal grant, but
the university left the money in the law school's budget, and
the need to spend it on a visitor arose only because I had gone
to work on the clinical training program.
On the other hand, there are situations in which this theory
makes little sense. Suppose that my school has traditionally
given scholarships from an endowed fund to one hundred stu-
dents, and that the federal government then gives it money in
the form of Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants99 for
another twenty-five scholarships. Since those students used to
pay their own way anyway, the school is financially no better
off. And the law, 10 as well as the terms of the endowment,
would prevent the university from reducing its own scholarship
contribution and spending that money on something else. Sim-
ilar statutory provisions often forbid recipients to reduce their
level of support to federally assisted programs. 1°0
Thus it is often not true that the recipient's own money is
freed up by a federal contribution-or at least it is not freed up
for expenditure outside the federally assisted program or activ-
ity. But even when money is freed up it is often impossible to
determine where such funds are spent. One might suppose that
a federal grant to my law school frees up money which the
university can then spend on athletics. But one could also en-
vision the state legislature reducing the university's budget by
that amount, and spending the money on roads. The point is
that if the justification for imposing restrictions on a recipient is
that federal aid has caused discrimination by freeing up funds,
that assumption becomes more unlikely the further one travels
in the budgetary process away from the program assisted by a
federal grant. This accounting difficulty is like the problem of
following chains of causation under Theory E (Benefits). The
Supreme Court reached this very same conclusion in Grove
City. 102
20 U.S.C. § 1070b (1982).
'o 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(2) (1982) (institution receiving federal funds must agree not to
diminish its own contributions to its scholarship and student aid programs).
10' See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1143(b)(3), 2736 (1982); Bennett v. Kentucky Dep't of
Educ., 105 S. Ct. 1544 (1985) (Secretary of Education may recover federal funds granted
to a state if funds are used to supplant, rather than supplement, state expenditures).
102 465 U.S. at 571-74.
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H. The Theory of Unrelated Conditions
I said above that there are seven different kinds of explana-
tions in current law for why Congress might attach nondiscri-
mination conditions to grants of federal money. In fact, there is
an eighth possibility, not embodied in current law, which un-
derlies H.R. 700, and to a much more limited extent S. 272. The
idea here is not that the federal government is in any way at
fault (Theory A), that it unwittingly contributes to discrimination
(Theories B, E, and G), that it may be perceived as contributing
to discrimination even if it is not actually doing so (Theory C),
that its purposes are frustrated by discrimination for which it is
not responsible (Theory D), or that it is hard to tell where federal
money is going (Theory F). As a general rule those theories do
not warrant imposing conditions on all of a recipient's activities
simply because it receives federal aid for one portion of them.
There are exceptions to that general rule. Most significant are
the cases where: (i) pervasive discrimination, such as in admis-
sions to school, necessarily infects all of the recipient's opera-
tions, or (ii) aid is given in unrestricted form, and can be used
anywhere in the recipient's operations. But those cases are
sufficiently unusual that they cannot support a broad rule of
institution-wide coverage.
1. The Theory
Even where none of the seven theories I have discussed
applies, one might look on the federal grant as an occasion for
buying as much nondiscrimination as possible from the recipi-
ent. Congress might say, for example, "We'll give you money
to build a park provided: (i) it's open to everyone, and (ii) you
eliminate any discrimination in your city government." Congress
might go on to add any number of similar conditions: "provided
(iii) your municipal buildings conform to the following federal
fire code: ... ; (iv) your city high schools require all students
to take four years of mathematics; (v) you forbid possession of
handguns within the city limits;" etc. Notice that conditions (ii)-
(v), unlike condition (i), have nothing to do with how the federal
money will be spent.
These expansive restrictions are an unusual use of the spend-
ing power. In fact it is an interesting constitutional question
whether the spending power alone gives Congress authority to
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impose such conditions. 03 Bear in mind that the Constitution
limits the federal government to certain enumerated powers,
augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. One of those
powers is the power to spend money for the "general Welfare
of the United States."'1 4 That allows the money itself to be put
to most any use-e.g., building parks. And conditions on how
a recipient uses the government's money are necessary and
proper means of making the spending power effective-e.g.,
requiring that the parks be open to everyone. But there is no
functional connection between the government's money and
conditions (ii)-(v). The only relation between spending and the
antidiscrimination rule (ii), or the handgun rule (v), is that the
grants serve to identify the class subject to the rule.1
0 5
I raise this point more as a scruple than as an argument against
any of these bills. The Supreme Court has frequently suggested
that "[t]here are limits on the power of Congress to impose
conditions ... pursuant to its spending power, ' 10 6 but it has
been a long time since it has actually identified one. 0 7 Moreover,
it may be that authority for these rules can be found elsewhere
103 Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474-75 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)
(the reach of the spending power, within its sphere, is a least as broad as the regulatory
powers of Congress).
'0o U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
105 There could be another connection between the rule and the grants: the threat of
revocation might also serve as a means of enforcing the rules. But oddly enough, under
the original version of H.R. 700 (sec. 3(b)), revocation would be limited to cases where
there was a causal nexus between the grant and the discrimination, i.e., to cases where
the condition was relevant to the use of the money.
There is now a moderately large body of academic literature suggesting that there is,
or ought to be, a limit on cross-over conditions attached to federal grants. Some
examples are: 2 R. CAPPALLI, supra note 64, at ch. 11 (1982 & 1985 Cum. Supp.);
Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
847 (1979); Lacovara, How Far Can The Federal Camel Slip Under The Academic
Tent?, 4 J. COLL. & U.L. 223 (1977); Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86
YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Note, Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance
of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694 (1981); Note, Using Federal Funds to Dictate
Local Policies: Student Religious Meetings Under the Equal Access Act, 3 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 187 (1984); Comment, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search
for Limits, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 293 (1975). Many of these arguments rely on federalism
limitations, however, and have been overtaken by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
106 Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981) (states must have
the benefit of a clearly expressed congressional intent to impose conditions on federal
grants when determining whether or not to accept such funds).
107 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (federal government right to appro-
priate and spend money under contracts for reasonable governmental purposes cannot
justify contracts not within federal power).
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in the Constitution: section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Commerce Clause. 1
08
Still, if the most convincing justifications for institution-wide
coverage are the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause, and not the spending power, one wonders why the
nondiscrimination rules are not extended to everyone rather
than limited to grant recipients. The obvious reason is that the
rules impose real costs, and the rules' sponsors believe that the
benefits from attacking discrimination absolutely everywhere,
taken alone, do not justify those costs. They think instead that
the costs imposed on any institution should be outweighed by
the private benefit that federal dollars confer on the institution
plus the public benefit from eliminating discrimination.
To reiterate, we should be cautious about imposing a general
rule of institution-wide coverage for two reasons. First, no one
who supports these bills assigns an absolute value to eliminating
all forms of discrimination; everyone instead believes that that
is a good (maybe even the highest good, but still not an absolute)
to be weighed against harms in considering legislation. 10 9 Sec-
ond, everyone believes that the cost of implementing thorough-
going nondiscrimination rules should be related somehow to the
benefits that federal aid confers.
100 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Title II of the
Civil Rights Act is a valid exercise of power under the Commerce Clause as applied to
a place of public accommodation); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Con-
gress was within its power when it protected commerce by extending coverage of Title
II to a restaurant involved in interstate commerce in food).
109 The process of weighing benefits (from eliminating discrimination) and costs (from
implementing the rules) is undoubtedly affected by the fact that these statutes or the
regulations implementing them have been held to forbid disparate-impact, as well as
intentional, discrimination by recipients. In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
463 U.S. 582 (1983), for example, a majority of the Court held that actions having an
unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed by agency regulations
designed to implement the purposes of Title VI. Id. at 584 (White, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court); id. at 623 n.15 (opinion of Marshall, J.); id. at 644 (opinion of
Stevens, J., in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined). Moreover, in Alexander v.
Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985), the Court "assume[d] without deciding that Section 504
reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the
handicapped." Id. at 720.
The inclusion of disparate-impact discrimination affects the cost/benefit analysis in
two ways. First, it greatly increases the number of cases where a recipient's conduct
is subject to federal control, and at the same time increases the possible gains for those
protected by Title VI, Title IX, Section 504, and the ADA. Whether these costs and
gains cancel each other out is not immediately apparent. Second, it subjects to coverage
recipient conduct that is not morally blameworthy-since it is by definition unintended-
and that therefore demands a more impressive showing of benefit to justify regulation.
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2. The Costs
I think that everyone involved agrees on the benefits that
would flow from a rule of institution-wide coverage. For that
reason I will focus on the countervailing costs, which seem more
controversial. I will begin not with the cost of compliance-the
one most frequently stressed-but with the cost to federal pro-
gram objectives when institutions refuse to participate. Sup-
pose, for example, that federal money is offered to fund a burn
treatment center at Hospital X, part of a large university com-
plex. Suppose too that the hospital would decline the funds if
the whole university would thereby be subjected to regulation,
but would take them if coverage were restricted to the burn
treatment center, or perhaps to the hospital itself. 110 In those
circumstances the federal government cannot get everything it
wants. It would be nice (i) if the hospital would take the money
to provide treatment for people with severe burns, and (ii) if at
the same time the government could look into charges of age
discrimination at the university's performing arts center. But
the choice the federal government has here is between option
(i) and nothing at all. In such a case it would be completely
irrational to deny federal funding, particularly when funding
would result in the elimination of discrimination at the hospital,
if not elsewhere in the university system.
I stress that this cost to federal program objectives is unique
to Theory H (Unrelated Conditions). If the hospital threatened
to discriminate on the basis of race in admitting people to the
burn treatment center there would be nothing irrational about
denying funding, since the hospital would be misusing the gov-
ernment's money (Theory B), or at least creating the false
impression that the government found the hospital's discrimi-
natory practices worthy of support (Theory C). Only when the
110 The example is not purely hypothetical. Both Grove City College and Hillsdale
College have announced that they would refuse to admit students with Pell grants in
order to avoid the costs of coverage just in their financial aid programs. Hearings on
S. 2568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 35 (1984) (statement of Charles S. MacKenzie, President of Grove
City College); id. at 107-08 (statement of George Roche, President of Hillsdale College).
To the extent that such a response deprives needy students of the opportunity to attend
the college of their choice, it frustrates a central purpose of the Pell grant program.
For another illustration of the problem discussed in the text-recipients turning down
federal money when the conditions attached become too onerous-see id. at 554-55
(corporations may refuse to participate in on-the-job training programs if their entire
operations thereby become covered).
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strings attached to funding have no relation to the funded pro-
gram is there a risk of losing an unmitigated good (option (i)
above) by trying, like Aesop's greedy dog, to get too much
(options (i) and (ii)).
Now the choice between option (i) and nothing at all is not
exactly the choice Congress faces at this point. There will be
some institutions in the same class as Hospital X, but Congress
might gamble that there won't be too many. It could hope that
the rest-faced with the choice between institution-wide cov-
erage and loss of a grant-would cave in, and the federal gov-
ernment could then have options (i) and (ii). How many insti-
tutions would fall into each group depends on the costs of
compliance and enforcement. But extending coverage beyond a
funded program to the entire recipient institution will increase
some of those costs exponentially. The obligations to undertake
self-evaluation,"' to take remedial action," 2 to publicize to pro-
tected groups one's obligations under the law,"13 to file compli-
ance reports, 114 to submit to periodic compliance reviews," t5 to
keep records," 6 to entertain federal officials responding to com-
plaints, 1 7 to keep abreast of new regulations, and so on, will be
multiplied not only by the number of newly covered programs,
but also by the number of federal agencies which-by granting
money to some activity within the institution-would now be
able to assert jurisdiction over every aspect of the institution's
affairs.
Imposing unrelated conditions has still a third cost, more
difficult to quantify, apart from the cost to federal program
objectives and the cost of compliance. If H.R. 700 is accepted
as a proper exercise of Congress's spending power then there
is almost no theoretical limit to the kinds of demands Congress
can make of those who get federal money. If a local grade school
participates in the school lunch program, Congress could dictate
to the state educational agency (which hands out the money)
what math and science courses must be included in the high
school curriculum. If a law school gets money to develop a
clinical training program, or if an undergraduate English major
" See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(c) (1984) (ED Title IX regulations).
112 See, e.g., id. § 106.3(a).
113 See, e.g., id. § 106.9.
"" See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(b) (1984) (HHS Title VI regulations).
"' See, e.g., id. § 80.7.
116 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(d) (1984).
17 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6(c), 80.7 (1984).
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gets a Pell grant, then Congress might insist that the university
hospital not perform abortions. 118 If the state police get some
money to buy new cars, Congress could order the state attorney
general to focus his prosecution efforts on organized crime and
drug offenses. In short, the Theory of Unrelated Conditions
threatens to work a major reallocation of decision-making au-
thority from local government and institutions to the national
level.
III. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. S. 272
The choice presented by these competing bills is a substantial
one. S. 272 is designed to "overrule" the Supreme Court's de-
cisions in Grove City and North Haven, which held that Title
IX covered educational institutions in a program-specific fash-
ion.119 It would accomplish that result by adding to Title IX a
new section:
Sec. 908. (a) Notwithstanding the decisions of the Su-
preme Court in [Grove City], and in [North Haven], the
phrase "program or activity" as used in this title shall, as
applied to educational institutions which are extended Fed-
eral financial assistance, mean the educational institution.
(b) In any other application of the provisions of this title,
nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to expand or
narrow the meaning of the phrase "program or activity" and
that phrase shall be construed without reference to or con-
sideration of the Supreme Court decisions in Grove City and
North Haven.120
S. 272 would add identical provisions to Title VI, Section 504,
and the ADA, so that their coverage of educational institutions
would be coextensive with Title IX's.
121
These amendments do not necessarily mean that aid to a
university hospital would result in coverage of the university's
118 That is not a practice that the government has any authority to forbid outright,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but it is one that the government can refuse to fund,
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). And if one takes seriously the implications of
Theory E (Benefits) or G (Freed-Up Funds), Congress would be doing nothing more
than refusing to fund abortions by refusing to contribute money to an institution (the
university) that conducted a program (at the hospital) where abortions were performed.
119 Grove City, 465 U.S. at 570-71; North Haven, 456 U.S. at 538.
110 S. 272, sec. 2(a).
121 S. 272, sec. 2(b)-(d).
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performing arts center. The reason is that the definition of "ed-
ucational institution" currently found in Title IX includes the
following qualification: "[I]n the case of an educational institu-
tion composed of more than one school, college, or department
which are administratively separate units, such term means each
such school, college, or department.' ' 2 2 The amendments would
mean, however, that aid in the form of Pell grants to undergrad-
uate students would result in coverage of the entire college of
arts and sciences, and the athletics department, 23 not just the
college's financial aid office.
124
Though I have misgivings, on the whole I think there is good
reason to enact S. 272. First of all, as the public reaction to
Grove City has indicated, there is significant public support for
wider coverage within universities despite the attendant costs.
Second, Pell grants and other forms of student aid-if followed
beyond the financial aid office-provide assistance to a fairly
broad range of activities within the institution. Although the 92d
Congress in enacting Title IX was mainly concerned with dis-
crimination in the awarding of student aid, 25 it would be proper
for this Congress to acknowledge that the money is returned as
aid to the school in fairly unrestricted form. Once the grant is
returned to the school as payment for tuition, the money can
be applied toward any of the numerous activities supported in
the school's general operating budget. And because it would be
so difficult to follow the federal dollars along that trail, Theory
F (Tracing) justifies a statutory presumption that they may be
spent for any activity supported by tuition and fees. Pell grants
then begin to look like impact aid and similar kinds of unre-
stricted grants. As to those forms of assistance, the rule has
always been that antidiscrimination rules apply to the entire
educational institution.
12 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1982). ED's Title IX regulations define an "administratively
separate unit" to mean "a school, department or college of an educational institution
(other than a local educational agency) admission to which is independent of admission
to any other component of such institution." 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(o) (1984).
13 See supra note 122.
124 Enacting and codifying S. 272 in its present form would cause this glitch: the term
"educational institution" is not defined in Title VI, Section 504, and the ADA, although
it is in Title IX. One reading 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6, where the Title VI
amendment would be codified, would thus be unaware that "educational institution"
was intended to mean "administratively separate unit." The problem could be easily
solved by saying that "program or activitiy" shall "mean the educational institution, as
that term is defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c)."
'1 See 118 CONG. REC. 5805 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also id. at 5808-
09.
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Moreover, several peculiarities of the current law suggest that
S. 272 will not work changes for which people are unprepared.
In the context of elementary and secondary education, much of
what Section 504 would do if applied institution-wide is now
already done better by the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act.126 Moreover, Title VI has long applied in a nearly
institution-wide fashion to grade schools and high schools (and
school districts) with segregated admissions practices. School
segregation was one of the chief evils at which Title VI was
aimed, and as I explained above, under Theory D (Infection)
the pervasive discrimination that results from segregated admis-
sions justifies institution-wide coverage. The reason is that
"[o]ne who is discriminated against in seeking admission is de-
nied access to all educational programs and activities within
[the] institution."'' 27 Given this inevitable effect, it is entirely
appropriate to attack the evil even though it occurs upstream
from any federally assisted program.
In the context of higher education, one of the chief concerns
under Title IX has been sex discrimination in athletics-a sub-
ject the Department of Health and Human Services (and the
Department of Education) has addressed with regulations now
a decade old. 28 While I doubt that those regulations, read lit-
erally, are currently authorized by Title IX,129 the agencies none-
theless enforced them with some vigor for at least five years
(1975-1980) and schools as a result have largely conformed their
behavior.13 0
My major criticism of S. 272 concerns the curious drafting of
subsection (b) of section 908. That provision has two clauses.
116 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1461 (1982); see Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3471-74
(1984); Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3379 (1984).
127 Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 339 n.2 (Ist Cir.
1981).
128 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1984) (HHS); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1984) (ED).
129 The regulations state that:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise
be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intra-
mural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such
athletics separately on such basis.
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1984); 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (1984) (emphasis added).
If the regulations are really meant to apply to all recipient institutions, they ignore
the program-specific language of Title IX. Since the federal government does not gen-
erally provide categorical aid for athletics, the regulations can properly only apply,
under Theory F (Tracing), to schools that get unrestricted assistance.
130 See Directive on the Application of Title IX to Intercollegiate Athletics, 43 Fed.
Reg. 18,772 (1978); see also Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy
Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
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The first says that "nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed
to expand or narrow the meaning of the phrase 'program or
activity."' The second says that "that phrase shall be construed
without reference to or consideration of the Supreme Court
decisions in Grove City and North Haven."'
31
I think it is wise to include the first clause, and I will explain
why by way of an analogy. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert'32
the Supreme Court held that an employer did not violate Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when its disability plan
provided all employees with sickness and accident benefits, but
excluded disabilities arising from pregnancy. Congress then en-
acted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 133 for the ex-
press purpose of overruling Gilbert. It did so by adding to Title
VII a new definition of the phrase interpreted in Gilbert, just as
S. 272 adds a new definition of the phrase interpreted in Grove
City. But it was not clear from the new language whether Con-
gress intended simply to overturn the specific holding of Gilbert,
or also to reject the test of discrimination which the Court used
in that case. In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v.
EEOC34 the Court imputed the latter, broader, purpose to Con-
gress, and held that an employer who provided full coverage,
including pregnancy, for all its employees still violated Title VII
by providing inadequate pregnancy benefits for the wives of
male employees.
Likewise, it may be wise to overrule the specific holding of
Grove City in the context of education, but it would be a mistake
to reject entirely the larger principle on which the case rested:
that "program or activity" means something less than the entire
recipient institution. Lest the courts construe the bill in the latter
way, as Newport News did, it is prudent to say that the bill has
no effect on any other application of the program or activity
rule.
The second clause, by contrast, is simply confusing. It could
lead to any of three very different results. First, and most likely,
the courts may reach, outside the context of education, conclu-
sions consistent with what the Supreme Court did in Grove City
and North Haven. It will just take them more time to get there,
since they will have to do over again what the Court did in
131 See supra text accompanying note 120.
132 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
133 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
1- 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
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those cases. If that is what Congress wants, it should not make
their job more difficult.
On the other hand the courts might reason that this clause
was meant to tell them something about the issue of coverage
that the first clause did not. By barring consideration of Grove
City and North Haven, a judge might conclude, Congress was
suggesting disapproval of the principles announced in those
cases. One such principle was Theory C (Joint Venture): the
idea that Title IX is meant to control some things a recipient
does with its own money. Grove City College was forbidden to
discriminate not only in handing out Pell grants, but also in
handing out its own scholarships. If Congress meant to signal
disapproval of that principle, then the courts should turn to a
narrower rule of coverage, like Theory B (Causation). They
might therefore say that the statutory term "program" means
"federal program," and thus the government's partners can do
what they like with their own money so long as they do not put
federal dollars to discriminatory use.
Grove City also rejected several principles broader than The-
ory C. It held that Theory G (Freed-Up Funds) was "inconsis-
tent with the program-specific nature of [Title IX],"'1 35 and sug-
gested the same thing about Theory E (Benefits). 13 6 So a third
possible result of subsection (b) is that some courts will turn to
a broader rule of coverage. None of these three results is desir-
able. All of them could be avoided simply by ending section
908(b) after the first clause. 137
B. H.R. 700
Like S. 272, H.R. 700 would amend Title IX by adding a new
section 908:
Sec. 908. For the purposes of this title, the term "program
or activity" means all of the operations of-
13-1465 U.S. at 572.
136 The Court said: "Most federal educational assistance has economic ripple effects
throughout the aided institution, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine
which programs or activities derive such indirect benefits." 465 U.S. at 572.
137 It would then read:
(b) In any other application of the provisions of this title, nothing in subsec-
tion (a) shall be construed to expand or narrow the meaning of the phrase
"program or activity."
I would of course change the parallel provisions for each of the other statutes as well.
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(1)(A) a department or agency of a State or of a local
government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that dis-
tributes such assistance and each such department or agency
(and each other entity) to which the assistance is extended,
in the case of assistance to a State or local government;
(2)(A) a university or a system of higher education; or
(B) a local educational agency (as defined in section
198(a)(10) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965) or other school system;
(3)(A) a corporation, partnership, or other private orga-
nization; or
(4) any other entity determined in a manner consistent
with the coverage provided with respect to entities described
in paragraph (1), (2), or (3); any part of which is extended
Federal financial assistance.' a
Essentially identical amendments would be made to Title VI,
Section 504, and the ADA. 139
It is obvious that these changes are more radical than those
proposed by S. 272. Subsection (1) broadens the coverage of
state and local government agencies. Subsection (2) does the
same for educational institutions, though it goes further than
S. 272 would. Subsection (3) tries to define the coverage of
corporations and other private (noneducational) organizations.
The effort to be specific about what "program or activity" means
in various practical contexts is commendable. The proposed
definitions warrant rather less praise.
Consider subsection (1), which deals with state and local
government agencies. One difficulty with the proposed definition
138 H.R. 700, sec. 3. Amendments to H.R. 700 proposed May 23, 1985 (on file at
HARV. J. ON LEGIs.) and currently being considered in the Judiciary and Education and
Labor Committees are slightly more specific. Subsections (1) and (2) of the amendments
have a slightly broader scope than the parallel provisions of H.R. 700. Subsection (3)
would read thus:
(3)(A) an entire corporatiori, partnership, or other private organization, or
an entire sole proprietorship-
(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private orga-
nization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or
(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education,
health care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or
(B) the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to
which Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other cor-
poration, partnership, private organization or sole proprietorship[.]
The amendments also exempt "any operation of an entity which is controlled by a
religious organization [ ... I if the application of section 901 to such operation would
not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization" (subsection (4)).
119 H.R. 700, secs. 4-6. Sections 4-6 of the May 23, 1985 amendments, see supra
note 138, omit the religious exemption included for Title IX. Section 4 of the amend-
ments (dealing with Section 504) includes an exemption for "small providers" from the
duty to make "significant structural alterations" to accommodate the handicapped.
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arises when a city or a state is itself the technical grantee of
categorical assistance. 140 In that event the nondiscrimination
rules apply to "all of the operations of" the city or state gov-.
ernment. Suppose that City X has received federal aid to build
an airport, and is charged with discrimination against the hand-
icapped in hiring at its sewage treatment plant, or in designing
a city park. The federal government is not, even unwittingly,
contributing to discrimination in either of the latter programs.
One could easily show that its airport money was not spent
there (Theories B (Opportunity) and F (Tracing)). And it is hard
to imagine what indirect benefit the federal grant might provide
to the City's other programs (Theories E (Benefits) and G
(Freed-Up Funds)). No one would suppose that the airport grant
signified approval of discrimination in the park or sewage treat-
ment plant (Theory C (Joint Venture)). Finally, the federal pur-
poses in sponsoring airport improvements-such as increasing
the volume and speed of interstate travel-would not be affected
at all by the city's discriminatory action (Theory D (Infection)).
Thus the only supportable argument for coverage in these cir-
cumstances is Theory H: the Theory of Unrelated Conditions.
As I explained in Part II, however, that theory entails costs
that may outweigh any resulting benefits. One such cost is the
possibility that City X will simply decline various kinds of cat-
egorical aid rather than subject itself to coverage in its parks,
sewage treatment plant, and elsewhere. The federal government
then loses (i) the primary benefits of its airport development (or
other categorical aid) program, and (ii) the chance to eliminate
discrimination at airports (or other places where its categorical
aid goes). Nor would it be irrational for the city to decline federal
aid. It might already spend a lot of time and money keeping the
Environmental Protection Agency satisfied with its sewage
treatment operation. Giving the Federal Aviation Administration
jurisdiction over the same operation (and over the city parks,
police department, garbage department, hospital, etc.) for pur-
140 See, e.g., Walker Field, Colo., Pub. Airport v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290 (10th Cir.
1979) (county and city must join as sponsors of airport improvement project to be
funded from the Airport and Airway Development and Revenue Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1742 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. 97-248, tit. V, § 523(a), 96 Stat. 695 (1982)).
In such a case the city, county, or state would be "the entity of ... State or local
government that distributes [or 'is extended'] such assistance." H.R. 700, sec. 3 (new
§ 908(1)(B)).
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poses of Title VI, Title IX, Section 504, and the ADA could
entail considerable additional cost.
41
The same kinds of problems afflict subsections (2) and (3).
Since a "system of higher education" is defined as one "program
or activity," receipt of federal aid for a university hospital at
UCLA would result in coverage of a performing arts center at
Berkeley. A research grant received at an Exxon subsidiary in
Texas could subject Exxon's worldwide operations to Title VI,
Section 504, and the ADA.1
42
In short, H.R. 700 would greatly change existing law and
expectations, and would entail the costs discussed in Part II. In
the debates on that bill to date, there appears to be no evidence
that existing law is so unsatisfactory as to warrant such drastic
change. As best I can discern, many of those supporting the bill
have acted under the mistaken impression that it would simply
restore the law to some happy state that it enjoyed before Grove
City. I hope I have at least succeeded in dispelling that
impression.
14 A second difficulty concerns the "trickle-down" provision in subsection (1)(B):
"program or activity" includes "the entity of: . . State. . . government that distributes
... assistance and each [entity] to which the assistance is extended. . . ." For example,
if highway or education money is given in the first instance to a state highway or
education agency, see, e.g., Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-157 (1982 &
Supp. II); Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (1982 & Supp.
II); and then redistributed to local entities, both levels are covered. But consider what
happens to the local entity in Ashland, Kentucky when the local entity in Paducah is
charged with discrimination. Section 902 now provides that discrimination may be
punished by cutting off funds to "the particular program, or part thereof, in which ...
noncompliance has been ... found." 20 U.S.C. 1682 (1982). But since "program" has
been redefined to include all local subrecipients, it is possible that Ashland could have
its funds cut off for what happened in Paducah.
One could avoid this unsavory result by stressing the "part thereof" language of
section 902. The difficulty is that section 902 may leave the funding agency discretion
to choose between "program" and "part" in cutting off funds. Another problem is that
by expanding the meaning of "program" one also may expand the meaning of "part."
H.R. 700 would solve this problem by amending section 902 to limit funds cutoff to
"the particular assistance which supports such noncompliance." H.R. 700, sec. 3(b).
The May 23, 1985 amendments unfortunately delete this provision.
4 The May 23, 1985 amendments would deal with this by breaking some kinds of
corporations up into geographically separate units. See supra note 138.
